Bloggers and commenters have been crying that the Fourth Amendment Sky is falling since Kentucky v. King was decided on May 16, 2011. A series of commenters and bloggers have wailed about how the Supreme Court ruled that the smell of pot now allows police to kick your door in, which is something that this case absolutely did not hold. For example:
- On Monday, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that cops can sniff out marijuana just as well as trained drug dogs
- Supreme Court eviscerates Fourth Amendment over marijuana smell.
- Supreme Court carpet bombs Fourth Amendment
- Supreme Court looks at smell based home searches for pot
All of them are wrong, and I'm guessing none have actually read the opinion. The sky is not falling. Kentucky v. King simply and only held that where the police violate or threaten to violate the Fourth Amendment prior to the existence of exigent circumstances, a warrantless search violates the Fourth Amendment. Please, if you don't believe it, read to the end. Read the opinion to the end, and/ or this blog post.
The rule is that police cannot enter a home without a search warrant. One of many exceptions to the rule is that if "exigent circumstances" exist, the police may enter a home without a warrant. For example, to prevent injury to someone, to render aid to an injured person, to follow a suspect while in "hot pursuit," or to prevent the occupants from destroying evidence. But then, there is the "police-created exigent circumstances" exception to the "exigent circumstances" exception to the search warrant requirement. If police create the exigent circumstances themselves, then the exigent circumstances exception to the search warrant requirement does not apply. That's what the issue is in Kentucky v. King.
The question is whether police created the exigent circumstances themselves by knocking on the door and announcing "police!" The Kentucky Supreme Court said that they did and therefore the warrantless entry was unconstitutional, because the officers "demanded" entry - an act that at best would result in a coerced consent to enter the apartment. If there is no warrant and there are no real exigent circumstances to enter the apartment, the only thing the police can legally do is knock and "request" entry to the apartment - they have no authority to "demand' entry.
Officers watched a controlled deal/ drug buy take place in a parking lot, followed the dealer into an apartment complex, and were confronted with two doors, one to the left and one to the right. The dealer had gone into the apartment on the right, but the officers smelled pot smoke coming from the apartment on the left, so they went to that door instead. They beat on the door "as loud as [they] could," and yelled "police, police, police." After beating on the door and yelling, they heard people moving inside and so, believing that the people inside were destroying evidence, they kicked the door in. After kicking the door in, they found three people inside, one of whom was smoking marijuana.
The Kentucky Supreme Court assumed for the sake of argument that exigent circumstances existed, bypassing the question of whether the sound of someone moving inside = evidence being destroyed. The Kentucky Supreme Court held that, assuming there were exigent circumstances, the police created those circumstances themselves - it was reasonably foreseeable that if the police knocked on the door and yelled "police" that the people inside would destroy evidence. The U.S. Supreme Court disagreed.
Therefore, the answer to the question before us is that the exigent circumstances rule justifies a warrantless search when the conduct of the police preceding the exigency is reasonable in the same sense. Where, as here, the police did not create the exigency by engaging or threatening to engage in conduct that violates the Fourth Amendment, warrantless entry to prevent the destruction of evidence is reasonable and thus allowed.
Basically, officers have not created exigent circumstances if they acted in a lawful manner. It is an objective test, and not a subjective test - bad faith intent to get around the warrant requirement on the part of the officers is not required.
The Court rejects tests formulated by lower courts that turn on whether it was reasonably foreseeable that exigent circumstances would be created - for example, it does not matter if the police know that by knocking on a door and yelling "police," people are likely to begin destroying evidence. If the police are not acting unlawfully, and if there are exigent circumstances, they may enter the home.
The Court rejects a requirement that police stop and go get a warrant once probable cause is established - police can knock, talk to the occupants, and request consent to search instead. If exigent circumstances develop, police may enter. The Court also rejects any requirement that police conduct be in conformity with best practices or department policies.
The Court further rejects the idea that police create an exigency when they “engage in conduct that would cause a reasonable person to believe that entry is imminent and inevitable.” Police can knock and/or yell as loud as they want. Alito explains, in typical sheltered-rich-kid Alito fashion, that:
unless police officers identify themselves loudly enough, occupants may not know who is at their doorstep. Officers are permitted—indeed, encouraged—to identify themselves to citizens, and “in many circumstances this is cause for assurance, not discomfort.” United States v. Drayton, 536 U. S. 194, 204 (2002). Citizens who are startled by an unexpected knock on the door or by the sight of unknown persons in plain clothes on their doorstep may be relieved to learn that these persons are police officers.
The Court does not decide whether the facts of this case (the sound of people moving inside) constituted exigent circumstances, and points out that the Kentucky Supreme Court did not sound convinced. The Kentucky Supreme Court is to decide this issue on remand.
The Court does not hold that police "demanding" entry to the home is not police-created exigent circumstances. In fact, it probably is. The Court ignores the finding of the trial court that police "demanded" entry, and holds only that where police knock and announce their presence, this is not a police-created exigency. The State Court is to decide the issue of whether the police "demanded" entry, on remand.
The Court does not hold in this case that police may enter a home without a warrant when they smell marijuana. The fact that officers stated they smelled marijuana is recited in the facts of the case, but it does not play into the Court's analysis anywhere. It's simply not a part of the Court's decision at all.
The Court's holding in this case is that, where an exigency exists (without finding that an exigency did or did not exist in this case), if the police did not violate or threaten to violate the Fourth Amendment prior the exigency, the exigency justifies a warrantless entry and search. A more direct way of putting this is to say, where the police violate or threaten to violate the Fourth Amendment prior to the existence of exigent circumstances, a warrantless search violates the Fourth Amendment.
Since I am late in reading this case, here's some other commentary worth reading:
Scott Greenfield also realizes that the case is not about the smell of marijuana:
The Supremes have spoken, and when the decision is penned by Justice Sam Alito, it's not a great sign. But Kentucky v. King could have been worse. It also could have been better. Some of the commentary, taken from writings about the decision rather than the decision itself, have demonstrated a rank misapprehension of what the decision says.
The issue was limited: What police conduct constitutes the unlawful creation of exigent circumstances such that the police cannot lawfully enter a residence without a warrant.
Brian Tannebaum notes the ridiculousness of the Court's distinguishing between knocking/announcing and "demanding" entry:
Respondent argues that the officers "demanded" entry to the apartment, but he has not pointed to any evidence in the record that supports this assertion.
The only evidence being the banging on the door. Why would anyone think that people with guns banging on a door were demanding entrance?
The criminal defense bar knows where this case goes. We'll be hearing new and different things in drug cases. The "noises" of drugs being destroyed will become a staple of the direct examination in response to the 16th "what happened next."
The opinion never discussed what the "noises" of marijuana being destroyed sounds like.
I trust it will be defined by the totality of the circumstances.
Orin Kerr at Volokh Conspiracy also points out the Court's passing over of the lower court's finding that the police "demanded" entry, and points out that this case is to be decided on remand, not by the U.S. Supreme Court's opinion.
Josh Blackman has an excellent article asking why something like the potential for destruction of evidence, as opposed to an exigent circumstance where someone is actually in danger, should justify doing away with the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement:
Now, the obvious answer is that it makes it more difficult for the state to prosecute the crime, and put the bad guy behind bars. But, so what? What “right” does the government have to evidence. I suppose destruction of evidence could be a crime, but my question, more broadly, is why a constitutional right is limited in these cases.
The government has no right to prosecute someone. The state does not have rights, it has power. Only people have rights. That power is constrained by the rights guaranteed by the Constitution. Exceptions to those powers based on those rights are just that, exceptions.