State v. Anderson - authentication of fingerprint card does not require testimony of the person who took the fingerprints
In State v. Anderson, decided December 21st, the South Carolina Supreme Court held that authentication of a 10-print fingerprint card does not require the testimony of the person who actually took the fingerprint. Although trial counsel did not object on grounds of hearsay, the Court noted that the fingerprint card is admissible under the public records exception. The only question remaining is then whether the document was authenticated.
State v. Rich, 293 S.C. 172, 359 S.E.2d 281 (1987), requires evidence as to when and by whom the card was made and that the prints on the card were in fact those of this defendant. "The State in this case presented evidence regarding: when and where Anderson's fingerprints were taken; how they were submitted to SLED; the process implemented by law enforcement for taking the fingerprints; and how an accurate record of them was maintained in the AFIS." In addition to the testimony of the State's "fingerprint analysis expert," who testified that the prints on Anderon's card matched the prints that were lifted from the crime scene, the Lieutenant in charge of the crime information center at SLED and who oversees the AFIS (automated fingerprint identification system) also testified as to the procedure by which fingerprints are collected and stored. The Court held that this was sufficient to satisfy the authentication requirement under Rule 901 of the Rules of Evidence.
It seems to me that this issue falls squarely under Melendez-Diaz, where the U.S. Supreme Court held that it violates the Confrontation Clause to admit a chemist's affidavit in lieu of the chemist's live testimony to prove that a substance is in fact an illegal drug, and the S.C. Supreme Court's reasoning is the same as that which was rejected in Melendez-Diaz - that it would put too high of a burden on the State to produce the live witness who created the document:
To require this type of testimony would create an unrealistic standard and, at times, an insurmountable obstacle for the State. Given the thousands of fingerprints on file with SLED, it would be difficult to locate and procure testimony from the actual person. There may be instances where the person has changed jobs, has relocated out of state, or may be deceased. If the actual person is unavailable for any of these reasons, then the State could never definitively establish the authenticity of a suspect's fingerprint card.
The U.S. Supreme Court rejected this argument in Melendez-Diaz, and held that we cannot disregard the Constitution because it is inconvenient:
Finally, respondent asks us to relax the requirements of the Confrontation Clause to accommodate the “‘necessities of trial and the adversary process.’” Brief for Respondent 59. It is not clear whence we would derive the authority to do so. The Confrontation Clause may make the prosecution of criminals more burdensome, but that is equally true of the right to trial by jury and the privilege against self-incrimination. The Confrontation Clause—like those other constitutional provisions—is binding, and we may not disregard it at our convenience.
Requiring the live testimony of the creator of a fingerprint card would not be as burdensome as the Court believes, it would merely create more work for law enforcement and the prosecution. Suppose that law enforcement gets a hit from AFIS from a latent print taken at a crime scene - even if they could not produce the technician or officer who took the original card, this would give them their lead to investigate and obtain further evidence, and wouldn't it provide enough evidence to warrant obtaining a new fingerprint card that could be authenticated at trial? This would avoid the possibility that an old fingerprint card was mis-filed, wrongly numbered, tampered with, or damaged, which is the reason that we require the testimony of the person who created the document.
