Waiver of right to counsel
In State v. Robertson, decided on Tuesday, the S.C. Supreme Court essentially held that a defendant can waive his right to counsel simply by not appearing for his trial. Robertson was charged with failure to register as a sex offender, was given on his bond form the required warning that he must appear on his court date or trial would proceed in his absence, was mailed two notices of appearances for court to his last known address, and then was tried in his absence without an attorney.
Although there was no express waiver of his right to counsel, the Court held that the above facts, coupled with the fact that Robertson had a prior record which shows his familiarity with the system, are sufficient to infer a waiver of his right to counsel from his conduct. In what seems rather twisted logic to me, the Court says that if a defendant elects to proceed without counsel, they must be advised of the dangers of self-representation under Faretta; but, if the defendant does not elect to proceed without counsel, there is no need for warnings and we may infer that they have waived their right to counsel:
We find both Prince and Faretta inapplicable to the instant case. Both cases addressed defendants who elected self-representation, and therefore the trial court was required to (1) advise the accused of his right to counsel, and (2) adequately warn the accused of the dangers of self-representation. Prince, 301 S.C. at 423-24, 392 S.E.2d at 463; Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835, 95 S.Ct. at 2541, 45 L.Ed.2d at 581-82. In the instant case, Respondent gave no indication that he wished to proceed pro se and instead failed to appear for trial. Consequently the Faretta requirements are irrelevant and pose no bar to waiver. See Jackson v. State, 868 N.E.2d 494, 500 (Ind. 2001) (warnings as to the perils of self-representation are irrelevant where defendant did not indicate a desire to represent himself).
